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Abstract
Purpose – This paper examines the relationship between accounting outsourcing and audit lag. Accounting
outsourcing may reduce misstatement risk, reducing the amount of audit effort necessary and thereby
decrease audit lag. Alternatively, outsourcing may increase the amount of coordination necessary between the
auditor, client management and the outside accounting service provider and thereby increase audit lag.
Design/methodology/approach – The accounting outsourcing/audit lag relationship is examined
among closed-end mutual funds. These funds often outsource their accounting functions and disclose the
names and services provided by any company providing services to the fund. These disclosures permit a
consistent measurement of whether the fund outsources their accounting functions or performs them in-house.
Findings – This paper finds a positive relationship between accounting outsourcing and audit lag;
outsourcing funds have audit lags that are two to three days longer than those not outsourcing their
accounting. The results are robust to different specifications, controls for the distinctive characteristics of
closed-end funds and consideration of endogeneity.
Practical implications – Closed-end funds could consider the increased time necessary to complete the
audit when deciding whether to outsource their accounting functions.
Originality/value – By identifying a unique setting in which outsourcing data can be consistently
obtained and analyzed (i.e. closed-end funds), this is the first study to empirically evaluate the relationship
between accounting outsourcing and audit lag.
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1. Introduction
Some companies use outside service organizations to perform their accounting functions (i.e.
outsource their accounting), and this accounting outsourcing may influence the audit of the
company’s financial statements. However, there is little research on the relationship between
outsourcing and auditing (Bierstaker et al., 2013). Most of the existing research on
outsourcing and audits focuses on internal audit outsourcing, including factors that may
influence internal audit outsourcing (Abbott et al., 2007; Abdolmohammadi, 2013), and how
internal audit outsourcing may affect the audit process, particularly external auditors’
reliance on internal auditors (Desai et al., 2011). A more limited stream of research has
considered factors that may be associated with companies outsourcing other accounting
functions (Everaert et al., 2010; Kamyabi and Devi, 2011, Cullinan and Zheng, 2015).
One aspect of the audit process that could be affected by outsourcing accounting
functions is the length of time needed to complete the audit (i.e. audit lag). Various aspects of
audit lag have been considered in the literature (Ashton et al., 1987; Soltani, 2002; Payne and
Jensen, 2002; Habib and Bhuiyan, 2011; Dao and Pham, 2014). However, the relationship
between accounting outsourcing and audit lag has not been explored. There are two possible
ways in which accounting outsourcing could influence audit lag. Companies outsourcing
The authors gratefully acknowledge helpful comments received from participants at the AAA Auditing
section mid-year meeting and the AAA annual meeting, especially John Abernathy, the discussant.

some aspects of their accounting may have reduced misstatement risk (Prawitt et al., 2012;
Höglund and Sundvik, 2015), and could experience a shorter audit lag, as less audit testing is
required for lower-risk clients. Alternatively, accounting outsourcing could require more
coordination and communication, as the auditor needs information from both the client and
the outside service provider (Bierstaker et al., 2013), potentially resulting in a longer audit
lag.
To consider whether outsourcing may influence the length of the audit process, we
examine the relationship between outsourcing and audit lag among closed-end mutual
funds. Closed-end funds frequently outsource their accounting functions to non-affiliated
administrators, and a disclosure of these accounting service providers is required.
Closed-end funds were thus considered an appropriate setting in which to examine the
potential influence of accounting outsourcing on audit lag.
We gathered data from all US closed-end mutual funds in 2011 and 2012. We find that
accounting outsourcing by closed-end funds is associated with longer audit lags, with funds
outsourcing their accounting functions experiencing audit lags between 1.8 and 3.3 days
longer than funds that do not outsource their accounting functions. These results were
robust when considering audit opinions that are issued simultaneously for multiple funds in
the same fund family, and when controlling for factors that may influence outsourcing
decisions through the use of a two-stage model. These results suggest that outsourcing is
associated with increased communication and coordination among the auditor, fund
management and the outside accounting service provider.
We contribute to the literature in three ways. First, we contribute to the limited literature
on how the use of outside service companies may influence the audit process (Bierstaker
et al., 2013). We also contribute to the audit lag literature by incorporating some distinctive
aspects of the closed-end fund environment in our audit lag models. Finally, we contribute to
the literature on the potential costs and benefits of outsourcing by assessing whether
outsourcing may influence the timeliness of financial reporting.
2. Outsourcing and audit lag
The financial statements of closed-end mutual funds are prepared by the fund’s
administrator/accounting agent. For some mutual funds, the administrator is affiliated with
the fund’s investment advisor/portfolio manager (i.e. the accounting functions are performed
in-house). For other mutual funds, the administrator is not affiliated with the investment
advisor (i.e. the accounting functions are outsourced)[1]. We consider two competing
perspectives regarding how the use of an unaffiliated administrator may influence audit lag:
the reduced risk perspective and the increased coordination/communication perspective.
2.1 The reduced risk perspective
The “reduced risk” perspective suggests that outsourcing of accounting functions could
decrease the risk of misstatement because the outside administrators may not be subject to
the same biases as fund management and may have better controls than the fund’s
investment advisor (i.e. management). Bierstaker et al. (2013, p. 215) note the potential for
risk reductions from outsourcing: “certain processes, such as those subject to management
bias, may be less inherently risky when outsourced rather than performed in-house”.
Consistent with this notion, Höglund and Sundvik (2015 and 2016) find that companies’
reporting quality (in the corporate tax and financial reporting areas area) is higher when the
company outsources accounting and reporting functions. Brown-Liburd et al. (2014) find that
when a third-party specialist is employed to value fair-valued assets, external auditors lower
the inherent risk.
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PCAOB Standards AU 324.05 to 324.17[2] provide guidance to auditors on issues to
consider when the client uses an outside service organization. One of the main issues an
auditor considers in deciding whether (and how much) to rely on the outside service provider
is the strength of the provider’s control process. Duganier (2005) asserts that outside service
organizations may have better control processes than if the accounting were performed
in-house. Similarly, Mazza et al. (2014) suggest that internal controls may be stronger when
information technology functions are outsourced. Outside fund administrators providing
accounting services to closed-end funds are typically banks with many different clients in the
financial service business and which face regulatory sanctions if their controls are
inadequate. Therefore, these outside administrators tend to have strong internal controls[3],
supporting the notion that outside accounting service providers may reduce the risk of
misstatement.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) periodically issues enforcement actions
against mutual funds when these funds mis-value their assets (and thereby misstate their
financial statements). We examined all of the SEC enforcement actions for mis-valued
mutual fund assets since the 1940s, which are referenced in SEC (2013). Of the 34 cases[4],
only one had an outside accounting service provider, and in that instance, the valuation
provided by the outside service provider was overridden by the client. These SEC
enforcement actions are consistent with a lower likelihood of misstatement when accounting
is outsourced[5].
A recent SEC enforcement action against Morgan Asset Management (SEC, 2011) further
supports the idea that fund financial statements may be more likely to be misstated when the
accounting is performed in-house. Morgan Asset Management was an investment advisor to
various mutual funds, and Morgan Keegan (an affiliate of Morgan Asset Management)
performed the accounting functions in-house. The portfolio manager for the funds managed
by Morgan overstated the value of some of the funds’ assets. If the funds had used a
non-affiliated administrator, the outside accounting service provider may have inhibited
these asset valuation misstatements[6].
2.2 Increased coordination/communication perspective
Accounting outsourcing could increase the amount of coordination needed among the
auditor, client management and the outside accounting service provider (which we will refer
to as the “increased coordination” perspective). Bierstaker et al. (2013, p. 215) note that
outsourcing “[…] can increase the complexity of the process and make coordination and
communication more challenging relative to when all processes are performed internally”.
This increased coordination and communication can slow down the audit and increase audit
lag. The time necessary to complete the post-year-end substantive testing can be especially
affected if the auditor must coordinate evidence-gathering procedures involving both the
fund management and the outsourced service provider. If the fund performs the accounting
in-house, the auditor is dealing primarily with one organization (i.e. the investment advisor/
affiliated administrator). If the fund outsources its accounting, the auditor must coordinate
with both client management and the outside accounting service provider.
The outside administrator may also be in a different city from the investment advisor/
fund manager. This potential geographic dispersion could further increase the coordination
necessary not only between the auditor, fund management and the unaffiliated
administrator, but also among members of the audit engagement team which could include
auditors from multiple office of the CPA firm[7].

2.3 Research question
The reduced risk perspective suggests that accounting outsourcing may reduce the risk of
misstatement, permitting the auditor to perform less testing and potentially reducing audit
lag. In contrast, the increased coordination perspective implies that accounting outsourcing
may increase the coordination and communication needed to complete the audit, slowing
down the audit and thereby increasing audit lag. Which of these two effects (if either) exists
and exerts a bigger influence on audit lag cannot be predicted from the competing ideas, and
is thus an empirical question. This is the main question of our study, and is stated as follows:
RQ. Is there a relationship between accounting outsourcing and audit lag?

3. Research methods
3.1 Identification of closed-end funds and data gathering
We obtained data on the closed-end mutual funds in the Morningstar Direct database for
2011 and 2012. Morningstar Direct contained 626 funds for 2011. We were unable to obtain
all the necessary data for 16 of these funds, leaving us with 610 funds from 2011. The
Morningstar Direct database contained 636 funds for 2012. Because data limitations, the
number of funds from 2012 was reduced by 8 to 628 funds[8]. Our analyses thus include a
total of 1,238 fund-years. There were 644 unique funds included in our analyses, 594 funds
were included from both years, while 16 funds were only included from 2011 and 34 funds
were only included from 2012. We manually collected data on whether the funds outsourced
their accounting functions (i.e. used an unaffiliated administrator for their accounting
functions) and most of the control variables, from the fund’s annual report. Note that we did
not use any sampling process; the funds used in our analyses represent the population of
closed-end funds for which the necessary data were available.

3.2 Variable measures
3.2.1 Audit lag. Consistent with other audit lag literature (Abbott et al., 2012; Munsif et al.,
2012; Habib and Bhuiyan, 2011), we measure audit lag as the difference (in days) between the
fund’s fiscal year-end and the date of the audit report[9]. This variable (Audit lag) is the
dependent variable in our study. The measurements and sources of the audit lag variable
(and all of the other variables included in our analyses) are presented in Table I.
3.2.2 Outsourcing. We measure whether the fund outsourced their accounting based on
our review of the fund’s annual report[10] to determine the name and affiliation of the entity
that provides administration services and/or accounting services to the fund[11]. We also
determine whether the entity performing the accounting functions was affiliated with the
investment advisor. We then code a variable (Outsourcing) which takes the value of 1 if the
fund’s accounting is outsourced (i.e. performed by a non-affiliated administrator), and takes
the value of 0 if the fund’s accounting is performed in-house (i.e. performed by an
administrator affiliated with the fund’s investment advisor/fund manager). This outsourcing
variable is the main independent variable of interest in our study.
3.2.3 Control variables. A sizable body of archival research has examined the
determinants of audit lag and has found that both client and auditor characteristics can
influence audit lag (Ashton et al., 1987; Bamber et al., 1993, Knechel and Payne, 2001; Habib
and Bhuiyan, 2011; Knechel and Sharma, 2012). Drawing upon insights from the audit lag
literature, we adapt these client and auditor characteristics to mutual funds. We also consider
the characteristics of fund families, of which most closed-end funds are a part. We therefore
include the three control variables detailed in the next sections in our audit lag models[12].
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Table I.
Variable
measurements and
sources
Count of the number of funds in the fund family

Count of the number of funds in the fund family with the
same fiscal year-end and the same auditor

1 if audit was for 2012, 0 if audit was for 2011

Number of funds in the family with the same fiscal
year-end and auditor

Other control variable
Year dummy

Coded 1 if the fund’s financial statements are audited by
Deloitte, 0 otherwise
Coded 1 if the fund’s financial statements are audited by
Ernst & Young, 0 otherwise
Coded 1 if the fund’s financial statements are audited by
KPMG, 0 otherwise
Coded 1 if the fund’s financial statements are audited by
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 0 otherwise

Natural log of the fund’s total assets
Total assets valued using Level 2 valuation inputs divided
by total assets
Total assets valued using Level 3 valuation inputs divided
by total assets
Total fund liabilities divided by total assets
Coded 1 if the fund’s fiscal year-end is November 30,
December 31 or January 31

Coded 1 if the fund outsources their accounting functions,
0 if the accounting is performed in-house

Fund family characteristics:
Fund family size

PricewaterhouseCoopers

KPMG

Ernst & Young

Auditor characteristics:
Deloitte

% of liabilities
Busy season

% of Level 3-valued assets

Control variables
Fund financial characteristics:
Log of total assets
% of Level 2-valued assets

Independent variables
Outsourcing

Length of the time (in days) between the fund’s fiscal yearend and the date of the auditor’s report

Variable measurement

Auditor’s report in the fund’s annual report

Categorization of funds as being in a fund family based on the
“Firm Name” variable in the Morningstar Direct database,
supplemented with hand coding for missing observations
Fund family as defined above for the fund family variable;
fiscal year-end and auditor match based on disclosures in the
fund’s annual report

The auditor’s report in the fund’s annual report

The auditor’s report in the fund’s annual report

The auditor’s report in the fund’s annual report

The auditor’s report in the fund’s annual report

The fund’s financial statements in the annual report
The fund’s annual report

Footnote disclosures in the fund’s annual report

The fund’s financial statements in the annual report
Footnote disclosures in the fund’s annual report

Disclosures regarding the fund’s administrator from the
fund’s annual report

Financial statements and the auditor’s report in the fund’s
annual report

Source
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Dependent variable
Audit lag

Variable

MAJ
32,3

3.2.3.1 Fund financial characteristics. We included the size of the fund as a control variable,
measured as the natural log of assets (log of assets) because of the skewed distribution of
assets among closed-end funds. We also measured the percentage of fund’s assets which are
valued using Level 2 and Level 3 (percentage of Level 2-valued assets and percentage of Level
3-valued assets). These Level 2 and Level 3 assets are more subjectively valued than Level 1
assets, potentially making these assets more difficult to audit (Ettredge et al., 2014), and
thereby increasing audit lag. We also include the fund’s liabilities as a percentage of assets
(percentage of liabilities) to control for the incremental work necessary to audit these
liabilities. Finally, we include a variable (busy season) to capture whether the fund’s fiscal
year-end was during the audit busy season (November, December or January). Audits of
clients with fiscal year-ends during the busy season may compete for limited auditing firm
resources, slowing down the audit, and thereby increasing audit lag.
3.2.3.2 Auditor characteristics. Some research studies suggest that auditor characteristics
could influence the audit process, especially in the financial service business (Moroney,
2007). Audit firm factors that may influence audit lag include industry expertise (Habib and
Bhuiyan, 2011; Dao and Pham, 2014) and audit structure (Bamber et al., 1993). Industry
expertise is typically measured based on the auditor having a minimum number of clients
(Reichelt and Wang, 2009). Because the closed-end fund industry is so large, all of the Big 4
auditors audit a large number of closed-end fund clients[13]. We thus have no clear means of
measuring industry expertise among CPA firms in the closed-end fund business. To control
for any differences that may exist among accounting firms with regard to expertise,
structure or other factors, we simply include dummy variables for the Big 4 CPA firms
(Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers)[14].
3.2.3.3 Fund family structure. Most closed-end funds are marketed as (and seen by
investors to be) part of a fund family. Most fund families also hire auditors not for an
individual fund, but to audit all of the funds in the fund family[15]. We determined whether
the fund was part of a fund family based on who the investment advisor was, and we
measured how many funds were part of the fund family (fund family size). A larger fund
family could command more attention from an auditor, resulting in a shorter audit lag for
funds in that large family. Alternatively, coordination of the audit work for multiple funds in
the fund family could slow down the audit.
We also considered the seasonal workload of the auditor, and how this workload could be
affected by the number of funds in the fund family that have the same fiscal year-end and the
same auditor. We therefore include a control variable (funds in the family with the same fiscal
year-end and auditor) measuring the number of funds within a fund family with the same
fiscal year-end and the same CPA firm as auditor[16]. If the auditor conducts multiple audits
at the same time for the same fund family, this “batching” of audits[17] could slow down the
audit and thereby increase audit lag.
3.3 Statistical analyses
To examine our RQ, we first tested a model of audit lag including all of the control variables,
but excluding the outsourcing variable. We then added the outsourcing variable to the audit
lag model to assess the significance and incremental explanatory contribution of the
outsourcing variable. We use robust standard errors to control for possible
heteroskedasticity. To control for possible outliers, all of the continuous variables are
winsorized at 1 and 99 per cent. We also ran all of the models in Tables IV and V
(untabulated), with clustered standard errors to account for many funds appearing in the
analyses twice (once for each year). The results were not materially affected.
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4. Results
4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table II. The mean audit lag is 53.92 days, with a
minimum audit lag of 19 days and a maximum of 86 days. Accounting is outsourced by 35
per cent of the closed-end funds. The mean closed-end fund has assets of $453,661 (in
thousands), the majority of which (68.99 per cent) are valued using Level 2 valuations inputs.
Assets valued using Level 1 inputs and Level 3 inputs comprise (a mean of) 26.03 and 2.03 per
cent of total assets, respectively. Non-fair-valued assets are (a mean of) 2.80 per cent of assets.
For the average fund, liabilities are 17.63 per cent of assets. Funds with fiscal year-ends
during the busy season comprise 33 per cent of our observations. The market shares of the
Big 4 firms suggest a relatively even spread among the Big 4 firms, except for KPMG, which
audits only 9 per cent of the closed-end funds included in our analysis. The mean fund family
size is 50.87 funds, with a maximum of 136 funds (the Nuveen fund family). CPA firms audit
an average of 10.77 funds from the same fund family at the same time.
The correlations among the variables included in our models are presented in Table III.
The correlation between outsourcing and audit lag is positive and significant, suggesting
that accounting outsourcing may increase audit lag. Outsourcing is also correlated with a
number of the control variables, which supports the use of regression models to measure the
potential incremental effects of outsourcing on audit lag.
4.2 Regression results
The ordinary least square (OLS) regression results are presented in Table IV. Column A
presents the model of audit lag excluding the outsourcing variable. The model is significant
overall, with an adjusted R2 of 17.00 per cent. Most of the variables are in the expected
direction and significant[18]. Column B presents the audit lag model including the
outsourcing variable. The model overall is significant, and the addition of the outsourcing
variable increases the explanatory power of the model, with the adjusted R2 value increasing
from 17.00 per cent (without the outsourcing variable) to 22.98 per cent[19] (with the
outsourcing variable). This incremental change in adjusted R2 is significant with p-value ⬍
0.0001. Consistent with the significant increase in the explanatory power of the model, the
outsourcing variable is highly significant (t ⫽ 9.13, p ⬍ 0.0001). The coefficient on the
Variable
Audit lag
Outsourcing
Total assets (in thousands)
% of Level 1-valued assets
% of Level 2-valued assets
% of Level 3-valued assets
% of liabilities
Busy Season
Deloitte
Ernst & Young
KPMG
PricewaterhouseCoopers
Fund family size
Number of funds in the family with the same
fiscal year-end and auditor

Table II.
Descriptive statistics

Note: Number of observations ⫽ 1,238

Mean
53.92
0.35
$453,661
26.03%
68.99%
2.03%
17.63%
0.33
0.28
0.33
0.09
0.25
50.87
10.77

SD
5.38
0.48
$471,178
38.24%
38.56%
8.16%
14.56%
0.47
0.45
0.47
0.28
0.43
52.02
9.91

Minimum

Maximum

19
0
$22,289
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0
0
0
0
0
1

86
1
$2,575,140
99.98%
98.99%
60.00%
46.48%
1
1
1
1
1
136

1

31

1

Note: Number of observations ⫽ 1,238

1.00000
0.14763
⬍0.0001
Total assets (in thousands) (3)
⫺0.03458
0.2241
% of Level 1-valued assets (4)
⫺0.01132
0.6907
% of Level 2-valued assets (5)
⫺0.01561
0.5831
% of Level 3-valued assets (6)
0.11087
⬍0.0001
% of liabilities (7)
0.18581
⬍0.0001
Busy Season (8)
⫺0.01812
0.5241
Deloitte (9)
⫺0.09708
0.0006
Ernst & Young (10)
0.14578
⬍0.0001
KPMG (11)
⫺0.07619
0.0073
PricewaterhouseCoopers (12)
0.00500
0.8606
Fund family size (13)
0.30517
⬍0.0001
Number of funds in the family with the 0.25489
same fiscal year-end and auditor (14)
⬍0.0001

Audit lag (1)
Outsourcing (2)

Variable

0.07052
0.0131
0.08429
0.0030
⫺0.11045
⬍0.0001
0.09537
0.0008
0.10006
0.0004
⫺0.00367
0.8975
0.46600
⬍0.0001
⫺0.34801
⬍0.0001
⫺0.14155
⬍0.0001
⫺0.04191
0.1405
⫺0.10350
0.0003
⫺0.03929
0.1671

1.00000

2

0.11456
⬍0.0001
⫺0.09137
0.0013
⫺0.08547
0.0026
0.16371
⬍0.0001
0.02033
0.4748
0.06693
0.0185
⫺0.06321
0.0261
0.02230
0.4331
0.05215
0.0666
⫺0.04595
0.1061
⫺0.04229
0.1370

1.00000

3

⫺0.96668
⬍0.0001
⫺0.05964
0.0359
⫺0.26532
⬍0.0001
0.46260
⬍0.0001
⫺0.05323
0.0612
⫺0.17076
⬍0.0001
⫺0.01425
0.6163
0.16620
⬍0.0001
⫺0.33169
⬍0.0001
⫺0.36768
⬍0.0001

1.00000

4

⫺0.17525
⬍0.0001
0.23595
⬍0.0001
⫺0.46727
⬍0.0001
0.06472
0.0228
0.18075
⬍0.0001
⫺0.00107
0.9701
⫺0.14200
⬍0.0001
0.36732
⬍0.0001
0.40428
⬍0.0001

1.00000

5

0.05215
0.0666
0.03202
0.2602
⫺0.03428
0.2281
⫺0.06804
0.0167
0.03778
0.1841
⫺0.04500
0.1135
⫺0.15068
⬍0.0001
⫺0.13816
⬍0.0001

1.00000

6

⫺0.20975
⬍0.0001
0.06684
0.0187
0.21537
⬍0.0001
⫺0.07576
0.0077
⫺0.21729
⬍0.0001
0.34288
⬍0.0001
0.30120
⬍0.0001

1.00000

7

⫺0.12955
⬍0.0001
⫺0.08902
0.0017
0.06491
0.0224
0.14506
⬍0.0001
⫺0.33228
⬍0.0001
⫺0.40148
⬍0.0001

1.00000

8

⫺0.43792
⬍0.0001
⫺0.19293
⬍0.0001
⫺0.35554
⬍0.0001
0.10154
0.0003
0.14941
⬍0.0001

1.00000

9

⫺0.22135
⬍0.0001
⫺0.40792
⬍0.0001
0.36709
⬍0.0001
0.11513
⬍0.0001

1.00000

10

12

13

⫺0.17971 1.00000
⬍0.0001
⫺0.20786 ⫺0.25929 1.00000
⬍0.0001 ⬍0.0001
⫺0.21442 ⫺0.03174 0.65564
⬍0.0001
0.2644 ⬍0.0001

1.00000

11
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Table III.
Correlation matrix

Table IV.
Multivariate analysis
results Dependent
variable: Audit lag

Intercept
Outsourcing
Log of total assets
% of Level 2-valued assets
% of Level 3-valued assets
% of liabilities
Busy season
Deloitte
Ernst & Young
KPMG
PricewaterhouseCoopers
Fund family size
Number of funds in the family with the same fiscal year-end and auditor
Year dummy
Number of observations
Adjusted R2
F-statistic
Probability ⬎ F-statistic
⫺0.58
⫺3.71
6.22
3.13
1.79
⫺1.30
0.53
0.37
1.14
6.99
4.67
⫺2.25

⫺0.07625
⫺1.95101
9.36644
3.79957
0.82206
⫺1.06215
0.41697
0.35630
0.85942
0.02882
0.08683
⫺0.63237
1,238
17.00%
22.12
⬍0.0001
0.5644
0.0002
⬍0.0001
0.0018
0.0741
0.1951
0.5970
0.7108
0.2538
⬍0.0001
⬍0.0001
0.0246

31.05
9.13
⫺1.21
⫺3.10
5.88
1.81
1.94
⫺2.42
1.63
1.40
1.48
7.41
5.44
⫺2.16

⬍0.0001
⬍0.0001
0.2251
0.0020
⬍0.0001
0.0700
0.0530
0.0157
0.1035
0.1629
0.1390
⬍0.0001
⬍0.0001
0.0310
52.34956
3.29472
⫺0.15238
⫺1.65506
8.31551
2.13175
0.88820
⫺2.04995
1.35964
1.38478
1.17787
0.03107
0.09606
⫺0.58398
1,238
22.98%
29.38
⬍0.0001

⬍0.0001

30.98

52.91998

Column B: outsourcing added
Coeff. est.
t-statistic
Pr ⬎ t

Column A: without outsourcing
Coeff. est.
t-statistic
Pr ⬎ t

284
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outsourcing variable is 3.29, indicating that funds outsourcing their accounting functions
have audit lags that are (on average) 3.29 days longer than funds performing their
accounting in-house[20].
The positive coefficient of 3.29 on the outsourcing variable (suggesting that audits of
closed-end funds that outsource their accounting take 3.29 days longer than audits of funds
performing the accounting in-house) is consistent with the “increased coordination”
perspective. This “increased coordination” perspective suggests that accounting
outsourcing could increase audit lag, as more time is necessary to gather evidence from both
the client (i.e. the fund’s investment advisor) and the entity to which the accounting has been
outsourced (i.e. the outside administrator). These results do not support the “reduced risk”
perspective which posits a negative relationship between outsourcing and audit lag.
The results for the control variables are mixed. With regard to fund financial
characteristics, the log of total assets is not significantly related to audit lag, but the
percentage of Level 3-valued assets[21], the percentage of liabilities and busy season are all
positively related to audit lag. Contrary to our expectation, the percentage of Level 2-valued
assets is negatively related to audit lag[22]. The CPA firm indicator variables suggest that
closed-end fund audits performed by Deloitte are shorter than those of other CPA firms[23].
Regarding the fund family variables, both fund family size and funds in the family with the
same fiscal year-end and auditor are positively related to audit lag[24]. These results suggest
that auditors take longer to audit funds from larger families and to audit a large “batch” of
funds from the same family at the same time.
4.3 Supplemental analysis
The results presented in Table IV indicate that audit lag increases when closed-end funds
outsource their accounting functions. These results support the “increased coordination”
perspective on the relationship between outsourcing and audit lag. To further analyze the
potential influence of increased coordination time on audit lag when funds outsource, we
added a variable to our audit lag model to account for the possible interaction between the
outsourcing variable and the funds in the family with the same fiscal year-end and auditor
variable. If CPA firms audit a large batch of funds from the same family simultaneously, the
coordination necessary when a fund outsources its accounting functions could be greater
than when the CPA firm is auditing a single fund (or smaller batch of funds) that outsources
accounting. This incremental coordination when multiple funds outsourcing accounting are
audited simultaneously could result in a longer audit lag than when a single fund with
accounting outsourcing is audited. Consistent with this idea, our results (presented in
Column A of Table V) show a significant, positive relationship on the outsourcing * funds in
the family with the same fiscal year-end and auditor interaction variable in the audit lag
model.
Research has noted the geographic concentration of the mutual fund business in
Northeastern USA, especially in Boston (Graves, 1998; Lounsbury, 2007). We also included a
geographic variable (Boston Office) to measure whether the audit opinion was signed in the
Boston office of the CPA firm. More closed-end fund audit opinions (36 per cent) are signed in
Boston than anywhere else[25]. Boston is also where the State Street Bank (the most
commonly-chosen accounting outsource service provider) is located. Audits conducted in
Boston may be done more quickly because of the large number of experienced personnel in
the Boston office (due to the large number of clients in the region), and because the most
common accounting outsourcing service provider is based in Boston, reducing the potential
geography coordination necessary. Our results presented in Column B of Table V are in
accordance with this notion. The Boston Office variables have a significant negative
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⫺2.13

⫺0.57206
1,238
24.03%
28.94
⬍0.0001

The Boston office variable is coded 1 if the audit opinion was signed in Boston, 0 otherwise

3.60

0.13895

a

3.41

0.05639

Note:

31.81
3.67
⫺1.15
⫺3.08
5.94
1.83
2.03
⫺3.02
1.89
1.20
1.73
7.10

52.66434
2.15685
⫺0.14324
⫺1.63307
8.62799
2.11702
0.91884
⫺2.68462
1.55400
1.18875
1.34569
0.03005

Column A: interaction added
t-statistic

Intercept
Outsourcing
Log of total assets
% of Level 2-valued assets
% of Level 3-valued assets
% of liabilities
Busy Season
Deloitte
Ernst & Young
KPMG
PricewaterhouseCoopers
Fund family size
Number of funds in the family with the same fiscal
year-end and auditor
Outsourcing ⫻ Number of funds in the family with
the same fiscal year-end and auditor
Boston officea
Year dummy
Number of observations
Adjusted R2
F-statistic
Probability ⬎ F-statistic

Table V.
Supplemental analysis
Dependent Variable:
audit lag
Coeff. est.

0.0331

0.0003

0.17753
⫺1.04916
⫺0.57138
1,238
24.44%
27.68
⬍0.0001

0.04831

52.87699
1.84596
⫺0.14946
⫺1.53738
8.50002
2.00930
0.89590
⫺2.01242
1.88706
1.51509
1.52782
0.02781

⬍0.0001
0.0003
0.2489
0.0021
⬍0.0001
0.0681
0.0427
0.0026
0.0583
0.2300
0.0840
⬍0.0001
0.0007

Coeff. est.

Pr ⬎ t

3.96
⫺2.20
⫺2.13

2.88

32.14
2.88
⫺1.22
⫺2.95
5.79
1.73
1.98
⫺2.14
2.23
1.54
1.95
5.99

Column B: Boston variable added
t-statistic
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Variable

⬍0.0001
0.0282
0.0330

0.0041

⬍0.0001
0.0041
0.2240
0.0032
⬍0.0001
0.0844
0.0483
0.0324
0.0257
0.1247
0.0516
⬍0.0001

Pr ⬎ t

MAJ
32,3

coefficient[26], and these results suggest that closed-end fund audits conducted in the Boston
offices of accounting firms may be completed more quickly than audits done in other
offices[27].
Note that in both models presented in Table V that the outsourcing variable remains
significant and positively related to audit lag. The outsourcing coefficient in the model with
all of the control variables (i.e. Column B of Table V), however, is reduced to 1.84 days. This
coefficient reduction suggests that some of the effects of outsourcing on audit lag presented
in Table III are related to the number of funds in the batches of funds from the same fund
families audited simultaneously and/or are related to a regional effect based in Boston.
4.4 Robustness testing
4.4.1 Common report dates and combined reports. The results presented in the analyses
above are based on measuring all of the variables for individual funds. However, many funds
are part of fund families and are audited at the same time as other funds in the family, and
often have the same audit opinion date. We therefore developed variables at the level of batch
of funds, with batches being defined based on the funds being in the same fund family,
having the same fiscal year-end and being audited by the same accounting firm. For the
independent variables in these models, we used the means[28] of the variables among the
funds in the batch. There were 370 unique batches of funds based on these criteria. Results of
testing our model of audit lag based on these observations are presented in Column A of
Table VI. The results of this analysis are consistent with the earlier analyses on an individual
fund basis: outsourcing is associated with longer audit lags, with the coefficient of
outsourcing being 1.55 days (slightly smaller than when measured on an individual fund
basis).
We also noted during our data gathering that the financial statements of some funds are
presented in the same annual report as other funds within the same fund family, and have
combined auditor’s reports. We also developed measures based on the means of the variables
at the level of the auditor’s report (rather than the individual fund level). There are 812 unique
annual reports for the 1,238 fund-years in our analyses. The results of testing the audit lag
model with the variables defined at the report level (with the number of funds in the audit
report substituted for the funds in the family with the same fiscal year-end and auditor) are
presented in Column B of Table VI. This analysis shows that the main outsourcing result still
holds: outsourcing is associated with increased audit lags of about 1.80 days.
These two robustness analyses indicate that our results are robust with regard to
alternative specifications of the observations in our analyses: funds outsourcing their
accounting tend to have longer audit lags. The higher explanatory power of the models (i.e.
R2) based on individual funds (presented in Tables IV and V) suggests that our use of the
individual fund-level analyses is appropriate.
4.4.2 Two-stage model to control for possible endogeneity. Factors that may affect the
choice of a closed-end fund to outsource may also influence the audit lag of the funds. To
control for this possible bias, we implemented a Heckman two-stage model. In the first stage,
we developed a model of factors that may be associated with a fund’s choice to outsource
their accounting functions. Models of mutual fund outsourcing have been developed by Chen
et al. (2013) for outsourcing investment advisory services, Cummings et al. (2015) for
outsourcing administration (including accounting) and Cullinan and Zheng (2015) for fund
families outsourcing accounting processes. We base our first-stage model on Cullinan and
Zheng (2015), which we adapted to the individual fund-level analysis used in our study.
The first-stage model is as follows: Outsourcing ⫽ f(fund age, dollar value of
market-valued securities, dollar value of good-faith estimated securities [i.e. Levels 2 and 3],
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19.64
1.98
⫺3.47
⫺1.50
3.54
2.11
1.27
0.16
3.31
1.69
2.16
0.88
3.24
2.26

⫺1.91
⫺0.55

61.41434
1.55008
⫺0.94271
⫺1.29214
9.77147
5.47596
0.87324
0.21869
3.77163
2.31618
2.40401
0.01196
0.22315
0.18477

⫺1.33945
⫺0.31055
370
14.20%
5.07
⬍0.0001

A: Observations based on batch
t-statistic

Intercept
Outsourcing
Log of total assets
% of Level 2-valued assets
% of Level 3- valued assets
% of liabilities
Busy season
Deloitte
Ernst & Young
KPMG
PricewaterhouseCoopers
Fund family size
Number of funds in the family with the same fiscal
year-end and auditor
Outsourcing ⫻ Number of funds in the family with
the same fiscal year-end and auditor
Number of funds in the same report
Outsourcing ⫻ Number of funds in the same report
Boston Office
Year dummy
Number of observations
Adjusted R2
F-statistic
Probability ⬎ F-statistic

Table VI.
Robustness checks
Dependent Variable:
audit lag
Coeff. est.

0.0567
0.5852

0.0247
0.11790
0.48944
⫺0.72294
⫺0.17507
812
15.33
10.79
⬍0.0001

55.82003
1.80884
⫺0.40747
⫺1.97874
8.56847
2.29831
0.68443
⫺1.22780
2.30609
1.87132
2.21585
0.03323

⬍0.0001
0.0488
0.0006
0.1338
0.0005
0.0353
0.2037
0.8765
0.0010
0.0920
0.0316
0.3822
0.0013

Coeff. est.

Pr ⬎ t

0.90
2.37
⫺1.48
⫺0.48

22.88
2.61
⫺2.04
⫺3.36
4.36
1.36
1.40
⫺1.17
2.40
1.79
2.52
4.20

B: Observations based on report
t-statistic
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Variable

0.3665
0.0179
0.1397
0.6314

⬍0.0001
0.0092
0.0414
0.0008
⬍0.0001
0.1744
0.1610
0.2441
0.0166
0.0731
0.0120
⬍0.0001

Pr ⬎ t

MAJ
32,3

fund family size). Because of missing data on fund age, our number of observations was
reduced to 1,150. In the first-stage model (untabulated), age was significant at ⬍0.0001 and
fund family size was significant at 0.01. Based on the results of this model, we computed
inverse Mills ratios, which were then included in the second-stage model of audit lag,
presented in Table VII. The coefficient on the outsourcing variable in the lag model in
Table VII is 3.57, indicating that our earlier finding of longer audit lags when funds
outsourcing their accounting functions is robust.
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4.5 Limitations
This study is subject to a number of limitations. First, closed-end funds that outsource
accounting outsource the entire accounting process. Other types of clients that outsource
only certain parts of the accounting process (e.g. cash disbursements or payroll) may not
have a similar influence on audit lag. Second, there are some distinctive aspects of the mutual
fund environment, such as the funds often being part of a fund family, which may limit the
generalizability of our results. Third, the results of this study do not provide direct evidence
regarding the mechanism by which outsourcing could impact the audit lag. The increased
audit lag associated with outsourcing found in this study could be due to: the increased
coordination effect alone or the increased coordination effect and the reduced risk effect may
both exist and the former outweighs the latter in its influence on audit lag. Future research
could consider the potential influence of partial outsourcing on audit lag or the potential
influence of outsourcing on audit lag among other types of companies.
5. Summary
Research on the effects of accounting outsourcing on the audit process is rather limited
(Bierstaker et al., 2013). One possible factor that accounting outsourcing may influence is
audit lag, which affects the timeliness of financial reporting. We examine the relationship
between accounting outsourcing and audit lag among closed-end mutual funds, which often
outsource their accounting processes and disclose whether they have an affiliated

Variable
Intercept
Outsourcing
Log of total assets
% of Level 2-valued assets
% of Level 3-valued assets
% of liabilities
Busy season
Deloitte
Ernst & Young
KPMG
PricewaterhouseCoopers
Fund family size
Number of funds in the family with the same
fiscal year-end and auditor
Year dummy
Inverse mills ratio
Number of observations
Adjusted R2
F-statistic
Probability ⬎ F-statistic

t-statistic

Pr ⬎ t

51.4883
3.5669
0.0000
⫺0.9778
7.9648
2.2276
0.4839
⫺2.5606
0.4953
0.0095
0.6795
0.0363

33.98
9.15
0.17
⫺1.85
5.52
1.83
0.97
⫺3.20
0.59
0.01
0.89
9.40

⬍0.0001
⬍0.0001
0.8689
0.0644
⬍0.0001
0.0681
0.3316
0.0014
0.5528
0.9932
0.3751
⬍0.0001

0.0373
⫺0.1598
⫺2.4037
1,150
24.13%
27.11
⬍0.0001

3.46
⫺0.61
⫺0.83

0.0006
0.5452
0.4091

Coeff. est.

Table VII.
Second stage of twostage Heckman model
Dependent Variable:
audit lag

MAJ
32,3
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administrator (in-house) or unaffiliated administrator (outsource) performing their
accounting functions.
We propose two possibilities for the relationship between outsourcing and audit lag:
(1) accounting outsourcing could be negatively associated with audit lag because of the
reduced risk associated with the preparation of the financial statements by a more
objective outside accountant (the reduced risk notion); or
(2) accounting outsourcing could be positively associated with audit lag as a result of the
increased coordination needed for an auditor to obtain information from both
management and the outsource service provider (the increased coordination notion).
We examine the audit lags of 1,238 closed-end fund financial statements for 2011 and 2012
and find a positive relationship between accounting outsourcing and audit lag. This finding
is robust to the inclusion of a wide variety of control variables, and to alternative definitions
of the individual observations. Overall, our findings support the idea that outsourcing may
increase the time necessary to complete the audit, as the auditor needs to coordinate
information coming from the client and from the outside accounting service provider.
These results are of potential interest to auditors in planning the time and staff necessary
to conduct audits of clients engaged in accounting outsourcing. Auditors could consider the
incremental time necessary to audit funds outsourcing their accounting functions when
budgeting and planning other audits which may use the same audit team members. Fund
directors and trustees may also find these results to be useful in making decisions regarding
whether to outsource their accounting functions, which may delay the release of the funds’
financial statements.
Notes
1. In all cases, the administrator is separate from the fund, but may or may not be separate from fund
management (i.e. the investment advisor). Therefore, in our study, the use of an affiliated
administrator is equivalent to management performing the accounting functions in-house, while
use of a non-affiliated administrator indicates that the accounting functions are outsourced.
2. The PCAOB has subsequently renumbered its standards. As of January 1, 2016, the relevant
standards are unchanged, but are referenced as AS 2601.05 to 2601.17.
3. The five companies to which the closed-end funds in our analyses have outsourced their accounting
are: State Street Bank, Bank of New York, Brown Brothers Harriman, ALPS Fund Services and US
Bank. We reviewed the service organization internal control reports (SAS 70/SSAE 16 reports) for
each of the five companies for the relevant periods and all received unqualified opinions.
4. There were links to 53 separate enforcement actions in SEC (2013). However, many of the individual
instances of financial misreporting resulted in more than one enforcement action.
5. The results should be interpreted with caution; however, as we cannot measure the prevalence of
accounting outsourcing by funds over this period.
6. While gathering data for the closed-end funds in our sample, we noted that the funds managed by
Morgan no longer do their accounting in-house, but have chosen (after the events described in the
SEC’s enforcement action) to outsource their accounting to a non-affiliated administrator.
7. One of the co-authors of this study, when working in the Boston office of a Big N CPA firm,
performed audit testing at a Boston-based fund administrator for a New York-based mutual fund
client. This testing was done in coordination with audit staff from the New York office. Recent
conversations between the author and Boston-based mutual fund auditors indicate that the use of
auditors located near a fund’s outside administrator (even when the fund is based elsewhere) is still
a common practice.

8. The principal data limitation for both years was a lack of annual reports for some funds, especially
for those funds that were newly formed, or funds for which we could not clearly determine whether
the accounting was performed in-house or outsourced.
9. We also ran all of our models with the log of audit lag as the dependent variable. The results were
consistent with the results presented in this paper. Because the explanatory power of the models
(R2) with the raw audit lag (i.e. in days) was higher than that for the models using the log
transformation of audit lag, we present the models with the untransformed audit lag variable.
10. In a limited number of cases, we had to examine documents outside of the annual report (such as the
NSAR-B, which provides information on some of the fund’s service providers) to properly
determine whether the accounting functions were performed in-house or outsourced. For a very
limited group of funds, we were unable to clearly determine whether the accounting functions were
performed in house or were outsourced. These funds were not included in our analyses.
11. Most of the funds had a simple administrative structure with one administrator. However, we had
to read the disclosures and footnotes carefully as some funds had complicated administrative
structures. As examples, some funds use more than one administrator, or the administrator uses a
sub-administrator, or the fund has an affiliated administrator and a separate “accounting agent”.
12. In addition to the control variables discussed below, we also included (in untabulated analyses)
other control variables, including the percentage of fund’s assets held in cash, the percentage of the
fund’s assets held in foreign securities, portfolio turnover, the number of different securities held by
the fund, the fund’s Morningstar risk rating, the fund’s overall Morningstar performance rating and
annual performance of the fund. Inclusion of these variables did not materially alter the results
presented. However, due to missing data on these variables for many funds, inclusion of these
variables resulted in a material loss of observations. To ensure that our models are as representative
as possible, we present the more parsimonious model excluding these other control variables.
13. The largest non-Big 4 auditor in the closed-end fund audit market is Tait, Weller & Baker in
Philadelphia, which audits 3.9 per cent (49 of the 1,238 fund-years) of the funds in our analysis.
14. In untabulated analyses, we included measures of the market share of the CPA firms rather than the
firm dummy variables. The results of the non-CPA-firm-related variables were not materially
different in these models. The predictive ability of the models with the market-share-based measure
was lower than that of those with the accounting firm dummy variables, suggesting that the
dummy variables provide better control for accounting firm characteristics.
15. Some very large fund families split the funds within the fund family between two different CPA
firms. For example, the Nuveen Family has 136 closed-end funds (in 2012). Some Nuveen funds are
audited by Ernst & Young, while others are audited by PricewaterhouseCoopers. We found no
instances in which a fund family used more than two different auditing firms.
16. Some fund families spread out the fiscal year-ends of their funds. For example, Nuveen has 136
funds, 27 of these Nuveen funds have a February 28 (or 29th in 2012) fiscal year-ends, 8 Nuveen
funds have fiscal year-ends on March 31, 10 Nuveen funds have fiscal year-ends on April 30th, etc.
17. For the Aberdeen fund family, different funds within the same fund family are audited from
different cities (the audit opinions of some Aberdeen funds are signed in Philadelphia, while the
audit opinions of other Aberdeen funds are signed in Boston). For our measure of the “batch” size,
the Aberdeen funds audited in different cities were not considered to be in the same batch of
closed-end fund audits.
18. All of the variance inflation factors in all of our models were below 10, which is below the cutoff for
significant multicollinearity concerns identified by Mendenhall and Sincich (1986).
19. This R2 value is similar to other recent audit lag research (Habib and Bhuiyan, 2011, Table 3, find
adjusted R2 values in the mid-20 per cent range).
20. In untabulated analyses, we separate the outsourcing variable into two variables representing
outsourcing to State Street Bank (the largest provider of outsourcing services) and outsourcing to
non-State-Street service providers. Both of these variables were significantly positive, with
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coefficients of 3.6 (outsourcing to State Street) and 2.7 (outsourcing to non-State-Street service
providers). The difference in these coefficients is marginally significant (F ⫽ 3.10; p-value ⫽ 0.078).
21. The percentage of assets valued using Level 1 inputs is not included in our model because the
percentages of assets valued using Levels 1, 2 and 3 inputs would then be a linear combination,
violating OLS regression assumptions. The percentage of Level 1 assets is therefore the base
category, and the coefficients on the percentage of Level 2(3)-valued assets represent the incremental
effects of these assets relative to Level 1-valued assets.
22. We might speculate that because Level 2 assets are the most common type of assets among
closed-end funds (68.99 per cent of assets are Level 2-valued assets), these types of assets may be a
higher priority for auditors.
23. In untabulated analyses, we also included a variable for whether the fund changed auditors. This
variable was not significant, and did not materially affect any of the other results. There were very
few funds changing auditor (e.g. 2 auditor changes in 2012).
24. While the funds in the family with the same fiscal year-end and auditor and fund family size variables
are correlated (r ⫽ 0.665), the incremental effect of funds in the family with the same fiscal year-end
and auditor variable over the fund family size variable indicates that both variables are potentially
important factors related to audit lag. Also, the variance inflation factors for the variables are 2.24
(for fund family size) and 2.13 (for funds in the family with the same fiscal year-end and auditor),
indicating that inclusion of both variables does not cause collinearity concerns.
25. The next most common opinion city was New York, with only 15 per cent of audit opinions signed
there. In untabulated analyses, this variable was marginally significant (p ⫽ 0.071) and negatively
related to audit lag.
26. In untabulated analyses, we included a variable measuring the share of audit opinions signed in
each city that were issued for the funds in our analysis. Results for this variable were not significant,
suggesting that the distinctive confluence of the large number of fund audits conducted in Boston
and the presence of large fund service providers in this geographic area may be the main driver of
this result.
27. These results should be interpreted with caution, as the variable only measures whether the audit
opinion was signed in Boston. We are not able to measure whether the Boston office may have been
involved in audits of funds for which the administrator and/or custodian was in the Boston area, but
which were signed in another area where the fund/investment advisor and audit engagement
partner were located.
28. For both of the analysis presented in Table VI, we also measured the variables based on the
maximum value for any fund within the batch of funds (as in Column A) or the fund report (as in
column B). Results were materially consistent with those presented in Table VI.
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